Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 13
pro vyhledávání: '"Filippo Melzani"'
Publikováno v:
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems. 23:1-17
Implementing a cryptographic circuit poses challenges not always acknowledged in the backing mathematical theory. One of them is the vulnerability against side-channel attacks . A side-channel attack is a procedure that uses information leaked by the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::24d71fdbb6b745e81caafba345ad9940
https://doi.org/10.1145/3241047
https://doi.org/10.1145/3241047
Publikováno v:
FDTC
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of exfiltrating a key from an AES primitive by injecting double transient faults into the digital circuit using two laser lights. We present some theoretical consideration on the effectiveness of this approach a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::39771c13da48e6aca763244d9fcd7074
https://doi.org/10.1109/fdtc.2018.00012
https://doi.org/10.1109/fdtc.2018.00012
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Computers
This brief deals with the problem of mathematically formalizing hardware circuits' vulnerability to side-channel attacks. We investigate whether spectral analysis is a useful analytical tool for this purpose by building a mathematically sound theory
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e61740fc5c435646c76aa710894b5bbe
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Computers
In this paper, we deal with the problem of efficiently assessing the higher order vulnerability of a hardware cryptographic circuit. Our main concern is to provide methods that allow a circuit designer to detect early in the design cycle if the imple
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7c9e0897122148b8ace52eec010fc419
http://hdl.handle.net/11311/1029489
http://hdl.handle.net/11311/1029489
Publikováno v:
FDTC
Fault attacks are among the most effective techniquesto break real implementations of cryptographic algorithms. They usually require some kind of knowledge bythe attacker on the effect of the faults on the target device, which in practice turns to be
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ee766f6b53b35d917065701e52247572
https://doi.org/10.1109/fdtc.2015.14
https://doi.org/10.1109/fdtc.2015.14
Publikováno v:
Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering ISBN: 9783319241258
SPACE
SPACE
In this paper we present a novel attack based on photonic emission analysis targeting software implementations of AES. We focus on the particular case in which the attacker can collect the photonic emission of a limited number of sense amplifiers e.g
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2e956f5644ccb32b178696fe52e32bc8
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24126-5_11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24126-5_11
Publikováno v:
HASP@ISCA
Several attacks based on fault injection have been presented against the AES algorithm. Most of these attacks belong to the class of Differential Fault Analysis. Every attack relies on a specific fault model defined as hypothesis by the authors of th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::90b28ca26eac8e57930ea658a6d98e2f
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/90879
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/90879
Autor:
Andrea Palomba, Filippo Melzani
Publikováno v:
HOST
This paper gives an assessment of the threats posed by Fault Sensitivity Analysis attacks. We propose an overall discussion of the possibilities in attacking a hardware implementation of AES. The limitations of the current methodology are presented,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1536d16139618371123b020b9096d499
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2013.6581560
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2013.6581560
Autor:
F. De Santis, Filippo Melzani, Alessandro Barenghi, Andrea Palomba, Gerardo Pelosi, Luca Breveglieri
Dependable and trustworthy security solutions have emerged as a crucial requirement in the specification of the applications and protocols employed in modern Information Systems (IS). Threats to the security of embedded devices, such as smart phones
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7afa3160d4862d097d8bd838205d5a40
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4030-6.ch006
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4030-6.ch006
Publikováno v:
DSD
Side-channel attacks are a realistic threat to the security of real world implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In order to evaluate the resistance of designs against power analysis attacks, power values obtained from circuit simulations in ea
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::039546d641339559a123af235557ddbc
http://hdl.handle.net/11311/635462
http://hdl.handle.net/11311/635462