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of 205
pro vyhledávání: '"Fiat, Amos"'
A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, which enables players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in retrospect. Howe
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.05590
Publikováno v:
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35 (NeurIPS 2022)
We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely arbitrary (i.e., determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with private valuations for the good and the goal is to design a mechanism th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.06846
We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We show how to
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.08634
The existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, even for additive valuations. The current state of the art is that no setting where EFX allocations are impossible is known, and EFX is known to exist for ($i$) agents with id
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.10654
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ that captures her private information, and the valuation function of every agent depends on the entire signal profile, ${\bf s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08384
Akademický článek
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We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to $n$ potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a known function of all $n$ private signals. Th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1806.03865
We explore issues of dynamic supply and demand in ride sharing services such as Lyft and Uber, where demand fluctuates over time and geographic location. We seek to maximize social welfare which depends on taxicab and passenger locations, passenger v
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.09672
In their seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani (STOC'90) introduce the online bipartite matching problem, and the RANKING algorithm, which admits a tight $1-\frac{1}{e}$ competitive ratio. Since its publication, the problem has received consider
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.06637
We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic agents, delaying scheduling decisions makes little sense. Moreover, the m
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.03244