Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 71
pro vyhledávání: '"Feng, Yiding"'
We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser constraints such a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07374
We consider a novel dynamic pricing and learning setting where in addition to setting prices of products in sequential rounds, the seller also ex-ante commits to 'advertising schemes'. That is, in the beginning of each round the seller can decide wha
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.14385
Autor:
Candogan, Ozan, Feng, Yiding
The recent large scale availability of mobility data, which captures individual mobility patterns, poses novel operational problems that are exciting and challenging. Motivated by this, we introduce and study a variant of the (cost-minimization) faci
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.06246
Autor:
Feng, Yiding, Niazadeh, Rad
In several applications of real-time matching of demand to supply in online marketplaces, the platform allows for some latency to batch the demand and improve the efficiency. Motivated by these applications, we study the optimal trade-off between bat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.16581
Matching and pricing are two critical levers in two-sided marketplaces to connect demand and supply. The platform can produce more efficient matching and pricing decisions by batching the demand requests. We initiate the study of the two-stage stocha
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11648
Motivated by applications in cloud computing spot markets and selling banner ads on popular websites, we study the online resource allocation problem with overbooking and cancellation costs, also known as the \emph{buyback} setting. To model this pro
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11570
Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet many empirical evidence suggests that human decisions may deviate from
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.08253
We introduce and study the online Bayesian recommendation problem for a platform, who can observe a utility-relevant state of a product, repeatedly interacting with a population of myopic users through an online recommendation mechanism. This paradig
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.06135
We study a natural competitive-information-design variant for the Pandora's Box problem (Weitzman 1979), where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what information about the box's prize value to be revealed to th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03769
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a given class. Most results in this literature focus on mechanisms with tru
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.13496