Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"Felix Zhiyu Feng"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Empirical Finance. 64:128-143
Firms under the threat of hedge fund activism on average experience significant losses of outstanding bondholder wealth: their bond yields rise while prices fall and ratings deteriorate. Under-threat firms receive inferior terms when initiating new l
Autor:
Felix Zhiyu Feng, Mark M. Westerfield
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 140:560-581
We study a firm’s internal resource allocation using a dynamic principal-agent model with endogenous cash flow volatility. The principal supplies the agent with resources for productive use, but the agent has private control over both project volat
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 208:105606
Autor:
Felix Zhiyu Feng
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 56:2039-2071
This article studies dynamic compensation and risk management under cash-flow volatility shocks. The optimal contract depends critically on firms’ ability to make good on promised future payments to managers. When volatility is low, firms with full
Publikováno v:
Journal of Corporate Finance. 76:102241
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Internal monitoring is a cardinal responsibility of the board of directors, many of which have been subject to relentless criticism of conceding too much power to the managers and allowing them too much latitude. We analyze the role of internal monit
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Capital outflows after financial integration can lead to simultaneous increases in the national savings rate and asset prices of an economy with substantial financing costs. Under autarky, firms invest in risky capital while facing a borrowing constr
Autor:
Felix Zhiyu Feng
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies the implications of persistent private information on a firm's optimal financing and investment policies. In a dynamic agency model, an investor supplies capital to an entrepreneur with an opaque production technology. The investor
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies a continuous-time, nite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. The problem is formulated as a dynamic game played among the agent, the principal and their
Publikováno v:
Journal of Corporate Finance. 63:101258
We explore theoretically and empirically the relationship between firm productivity and liquidity management in the presence of financial frictions. We build a dynamic investment model and show that, counter to basic economic intuition, more producti