Strategic Appointments

Autor: Bertelli, Anthony, Feldmann, Sven E.

Publikováno v: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 2007 Jan 01. 17(1), 19-38.

Externí odkaz: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4139730

Lobbying Legislatures

Autor: Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E.

Publikováno v: Journal of Political Economy, 2002 Aug . 110(4), 919-946.

Externí odkaz: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/340775

Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure.

Autor: Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E.

Publikováno v: Business & Politics. Aug2002, Vol. 4 Issue 2, p187-203. 17p.

Lobbying Legislatures

Autor: Morten Bennedsen, Feldmann, Sven E.

Publikováno v: University of Copenhagen

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and transmit policy

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a007d60a15cbd26a9d8a8a27395a97dc

Strong Firms Lobby, Weak Firms Bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption

Autor: Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E., Lassen, David Dreyer

Publikováno v: Bennedsen, M, Feldmann, S E & Lassen, D D 2009 ' Strong Firms Lobby, Weak Firms Bribe : A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption ' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen .

We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are unc

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::56446b0c9009a438cbc0a4ce4ef279e2
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82131