Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 331
pro vyhledávání: '"Faliszewski, P."'
Autor:
Faliszewski, Piotr, Janeczko, Łukasz, Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej, Lisowski, Grzegorz, Skowron, Piotr, Szufa, Stanisław
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.18092
Autor:
Boehmer, Niclas, Faliszewski, Piotr, Janeczko, Łukasz, Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej, Lisowski, Grzegorz, Pierczyński, Grzegorz, Rey, Simon, Stolicki, Dariusz, Szufa, Stanisław, Wąs, Tomasz
We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within the computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMAS conferences). We analyze the sizes of the studied elections and the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11765
The Mallows model is a popular distribution for ranked data. We empirically and theoretically analyze how the properties of rankings sampled from the Mallows model change when increasing the number of alternatives. We find that real-world data behave
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.14562
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from several distr
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11870
Autor:
Boehmer, Niclas, Faliszewski, Piotr, Janeczko, Łukasz, Peters, Dominik, Pierczyński, Grzegorz, Schierreich, Šimon, Skowron, Piotr, Szufa, Stanisław
We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting (PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on lowering the projects' costs, obtaining additional approvals for them, and a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.14723
Autor:
Faliszewski, Piotr, Flis, Jarosław, Peters, Dominik, Pierczyński, Grzegorz, Skowron, Piotr, Stolicki, Dariusz, Szufa, Stanisław, Talmon, Nimrod
We provide a library of participatory budgeting data (Pabulib) and open source tools (Pabutools and Pabustats) for analysing this data. We analyse how the results of participatory budgeting elections would change if a different selection rule was app
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.11035
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such measures f
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.09780
We study the robustness of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB) rules to random noise in the votes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we study the computational complexity of the #Flip-Bribery problem, where given a PB instance we ask for
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.08125
Autor:
Janeczko, Łukasz, Faliszewski, Piotr
We study the complexity of deciding whether there is a tie in a given approval-based multiwinner election, as well as the complexity of counting tied winning committees. We consider a family of Thiele rules, their greedy variants, Phragmen's sequenti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.01769
Autor:
Revel, Manon, Boehmer, Niclas, Colley, Rachael, Brill, Markus, Faliszewski, Piotr, Elkind, Edith
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in every democra
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.02774