Zobrazeno 1 - 5
of 5
pro vyhledávání: '"Fabrizio Di Meo"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0820c8e407982de053a907a98e098cb7
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4323597
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4323597
Autor:
Annukka Jokipii, Fabrizio Di Meo
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Auditing. 23:292-307
We examine the association between several characteristics of an internal audit function (IAF) and fees paid to external auditors to support internal audit activities (co-sourcing). We also analyze how this relation is influenced by the mandatory or
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::afeb1bf2f1c11e6604a73c87d573b23b
https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12162
https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12162
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Educational Technology.
This study assessed how students’ perceptions of online quizzes and the use of three electronic devices to solve them affected their performance. A sample of 208 students enrolled in an introductory accounting course at the Universitat Autònoma de
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e0cf38f78b9d7246a04e0734864c3d77
https://doi.org/10.14742/ajet.4888
https://doi.org/10.14742/ajet.4888
Autor:
Fabrizio Di Meo, Maria L. Velez-Elorza
Publikováno v:
Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad. 43:217-240
In this study, I empirically examine whether the managers of firms that overinvest have an incentive to subsequently distort financial information for keeping up with stakeholders’ expectations about investment returns. Also, because CEO tenure is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::21479f5a9253fe8f0b2b07fb20f4742d
https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2014.942152
https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2014.942152
Publikováno v:
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 36(5), 399-414. ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
Agency theorists have long contended that managerial entrenchment is detrimental for shareholders, because it protects managers from the discipline of corporate governance. However, as a competing hypothesis, we argue that entrenchment can also provi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f4eac7ba5f66345195669c8c6476d89a
https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/5069d271-ae66-4019-8a65-d48d5b68fed5
https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/5069d271-ae66-4019-8a65-d48d5b68fed5
