Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Fabio Tollon"'
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
Prometheus, Vol 39, Iss 4, Pp 265-269 (2023)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/da0599affa1a44dd8d1029481f400fe2
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
Prometheus, Vol 39, Iss 4, Pp 274-276 (2023)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e508006ad72d4e0db8c367c9b7b905fc
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol 19, Iss 2, Pp A2-15 (2023)
In this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d26b5e2814b14769b51fbeaa5d128dd6
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
AI and Ethics. 3:295-302
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are ubiquitous. From social media timelines, video recommendations on YouTube, and the kinds of adverts we see online, AI, in a very real sense, filters the world we see. More than that, AI is being embedded in ag
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
Social Robots in Social Institutions ISBN: 9781643683744
In this paper I argue that moral status should be grounded in whether an entity has “capacities for relations”. What this means is that in order to have moral status, the entity should be capable of engaging in meaningful relations with others. I
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d4ad166d399713dd21d7ff997f381983
https://doi.org/10.3233/faia220649
https://doi.org/10.3233/faia220649
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
South African Journal of Philosophy. 40:182-194
As technology advances and artificial agents (AAs) become increasingly autonomous, start to embody morally relevant values and act on those values, there arises the issue of whether these entities ...
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
Ethics and Information Technology. 23:147-155
In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
Artificial Intelligence Research ISBN: 9783030950699
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5057346c4de59cb0c98377e650bacbf9
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95070-5_20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95070-5_20
Autor:
Fabio Tollon
Publikováno v:
Artificial Intelligence Research ISBN: 9783031223204
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::713423d855fe425355d2593750f39a4b
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22321-1_25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22321-1_25
Autor:
Fabio Tollon, Kiasha Naidoo
Publikováno v:
AI & SOCIETY.
The ubiquity of technology in our lives and its culmination in artificial intelligence raises questions about its role in our moral considerations. In this paper, we address a moral concern in relation to technological systems given their deep integr