Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Evaluative voting"'
Akademický článek
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Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Revue d'économie politique
Revue d'économie politique, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321. ⟨10.3917/redp.312.0129⟩
Revue d'Economie Politique
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321. ⟨10.3917/redp.312.0129⟩
Revue d'économie politique, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321. ⟨10.3917/redp.312.0129⟩
Revue d'Economie Politique
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321. ⟨10.3917/redp.312.0129⟩
National audience; All non dictatorial voting rules are susceptible to be manipulated by a group of agents; however, some voting rules are more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than others. The vulnerability of a voting rule to manipulation can b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::80d31f09f0d8a379d8087ade0531d228
https://hal.science/hal-03250076
https://hal.science/hal-03250076
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2021, 56 (4), pp.803-834. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, inPress, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3683849⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 56 (4), pp.803-834. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, In press, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3683849⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, In press, ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2021, 56 (4), pp.803-834. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, inPress, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3683849⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 56 (4), pp.803-834. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, In press, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3683849⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, In press, ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z⟩
SSRN: 10.2139/ssrn.3683849; International audience; Many voters seem to appreciate the greater freedom of expression afforded by alternative voting rules; in evaluative voting, for example, longer grading scales and/or negative grades seem desirable
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ecadf0d3f4cd3639b118c50fb35ad31c
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02926780/file/2024.pdf
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02926780/file/2024.pdf
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Federica Ceron, Stéphane Gonzalez
We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of norm
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a7da9eb129d7560bc0e8bf3b6f147470
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02440615
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02440615
Autor:
Herrade Igersheim, Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Jean-François Laslier, Isabelle Lebon
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Political Economy
European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 55, pp. 14-28. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006⟩
Dutch Social Choice Colloquium, » Université Erasmus
Dutch Social Choice Colloquium, » Université Erasmus, Jun 2016, Rotterdam, Netherlands
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, 2018, 55, pp. 14-28. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006⟩
European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 55, pp. 14-28. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006⟩
Dutch Social Choice Colloquium, » Université Erasmus
Dutch Social Choice Colloquium, » Université Erasmus, Jun 2016, Rotterdam, Netherlands
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, 2018, 55, pp. 14-28. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006⟩
International audience; During the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, participants in an in situ experiment were invited to vote according to " evaluative voting " , which involves rating the candidates using a numerical scale. Var
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::23cf6439c28bfbbaede3382a80e72670
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01618039
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01618039
Autor:
Antonin Macé
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 79, pp.10-17. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002⟩
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 79, pp.10-17. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002⟩
International audience; I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set. I focus on additive rules, which follow the utilitarian paradigm. Cha
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4c92cface99e79fc4e8308ecbcdfe7cb
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01222200
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01222200
Autor:
Dominique Lepelley, Hatem Smaoui
Publikováno v:
Revue d'Economie Politique
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2014, 123 (6), pp.827--850
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2014, 123 (6), pp.827--850
Le but de ce travail est d’explorer les proprietes theoriques de la procedure de vote par note a trois niveaux. Nous confrontons ce nouveau mode de scrutin, propose par Felsenthal [1989] et Hillinger [2004a], a un ensemble de criteres normatifs gen
Akademický článek
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