Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"Eva Schliephake"'
Autor:
Philipp J. Koenig, Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::51143e31d98de5ec6a74d678b141db6c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4033024
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4033024
Autor:
Hendrik Hakenes, Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
To maximize their impact, socially responsible households can invest responsibly (SRI), consume responsibly (SRC), or do both. The key question of this paper is, which mix of SRI and SRC leads to a desired impact with the lowest loss of utility for r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::866204d66b950d9cf2929f2cc1d0bff3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3846367
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3846367
Autor:
Philipp Koenig, Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1f0aa6e7ecec76a0c094101bd6407415
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3988528
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3988528
Autor:
Philipp Koenig, Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a standard banking model with agency frictions to simultaneously study the weakening and reversal of monetary transmission and banks’ risk-taking in a low-interest environment. Both, weaker monetary transmission and higher risk-taking a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::638af08bafa23bc1e0334755439560bc
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925073
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925073
Autor:
Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 48:1787-1814
Capital regulation forces banks to fund a substantial amount of their investments with equity. This creates a buffer against losses but also increases the cost of funding. If higher funding costs translate into higher loan interest rates, the bank's
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::295d9c3cbc6ef259f51ae842281a7abe
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12371
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12371
Autor:
Hendrik Hakenes, Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
To provide maturity transformation, banks need a deposit base – deposits that could be, but are not, withdrawn most of the time and are, thus, used for long-termlending. In a global-games environment, we show that a higher deposit base protects ban
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8ccdda23cb221998b951b8b12cd48b81
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431160
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431160
Autor:
Florian Buck, Eva Schliephake
Publikováno v:
Journal of Banking & Finance. 37:4584-4598
We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, wh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7abbc9cf8c5a84639d973deac8cdf283
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.012
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.012
Autor:
Eva Schliephake, Roland Kirstein
Publikováno v:
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 45:675-700
This paper analyses the competitive effects of capital requirement regulation on an oligo� polistic credit market. In the first stage, banks choose the structure of refinancing their assets, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b268ef39f738e4fcc0e12fad5a6592ec
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12020
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12020
Autor:
Florian Buck, Eva Schliephake
We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ee9fda72d68e2cc911d7363d0ef39599
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3923.pdf
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3923.pdf
Autor:
Eva Schliephake, Roland Kirstein
This paper analyses the competitive effects of capital requirement regulation on an oligopolistic credit market. In the first stage, banks choose the structure of refinancing their assets, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity as
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e87f6a2d9be4f26e0f1ec4a662c30956