Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 19
pro vyhledávání: '"Eugen Kovac"'
Autor:
Eugen Kovac, Deniz Dizdar
We provide a simple proof of strong duality for the linear persuasion problem. The duality is established in Dworczak and Martini (2019) , under slightly stronger assumptions, using techniques from the literature on optimization with stochastic domin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0fb4f7bd1febacd8e6505e8d0969d2d0
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&origin=inward&scp=85085338205
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&origin=inward&scp=85085338205
Autor:
Eugen Kovac, Robert C. Schmidt
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economics. 194:104329
We introduce a novel framework for analyzing coalition formation, applied to climate cooperation. Our model allows for multiple rounds of negotiations and is able to explain the formation of large coalitions. The incentive of each coalition member to
Autor:
Eugen Kovac, Krešimir Žigić
Publikováno v:
Research in Economics. 70:714-734
We build a dynamic duopoly model that accounts for the empirical observation of monopoly persistence in the long run. More specifically, we analyze the conditions under which it is optimal for the market leader to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment
Autor:
Krešimir Žigić, Eugen Kovac
Publikováno v:
Economica. 81:491-521
The important characteristic of international competition between developed and less developed countries is vertical product differentiation, where firms' quality choices represent strategic decisions. Unlike the previous literature, we allow for a l
Autor:
Robert C. Schmidt, Eugen Kovac
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 83:178-206
We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in e
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 34:1421-1441
We build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm (leader) invests in an innovation process, facing the subsequent entry of other firms (followers). We identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the i
Autor:
Eugen Kovac, Tymofiy Mylovanov
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 144:1373-1395
We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometric
Publikováno v:
Economics Bulletin. 3(9):1-9
We investigate the decisions of individuals in simple and complex environments. We use a version of the Guessing Game (Beauty-contest Game) as a vehicle for our investigation, employing mathematically talented students. We find that our subjects thin
Autor:
Daniel Krähmer, Eugen Kovac
The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fb5f5f75cc9c79399ee0ac8ce21ced1b
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17331/1/427.pdf
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17331/1/427.pdf
We build a dynamic oligopoly model in which a particular firm (leader) invests in process innovations facing subsequent endogenous (or free) entry by other firms (followers). All firms that enter the market incur positive entry costs. We identify con
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::2dab8630b77b652dfdeb68b3825aff2d
https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2010/paper_795.pdf
https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2010/paper_795.pdf