Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 63
pro vyhledávání: '"Erwan Morellec"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics, 136(3), 718-742. Elsevier
We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyon
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics, 142(3), 1038-1067. Elsevier
We develop a model in which a start-up firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is preferred to equity financing unless the platform expec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4d33d83efa454d965d6afaf29828f1de
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/bde57056-56c0-4aa3-bd5f-fcb325f3f3c1
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/bde57056-56c0-4aa3-bd5f-fcb325f3f3c1
Autor:
Alexei Zhdanov, Erwan Morellec
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies. 32:4343-4386
Most firms face some form of competition in product markets. The degree of competition a firm faces feeds back into its cash flows and affects the values of the securities it issues. Through its effects on stock prices, product market competition aff
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a dynamic moral hazard problem in which a bank originates a pool of loans that it sells to competitive investors via securitization. The bank controls the default risk of the loans by screening at origination and monitoring after origination
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Lending relationships matter for firm financing. In a model of debt dynamics, we study how lending relationships are formed and how they impact leverage and debt maturity choices. In the model, lending relationships evolve through repeated interactio
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies. 31:4232-4287
We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large an
Autor:
Erwan Morellec, Julien Hugonnier
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 125:266-285
We develop a dynamic model of banking to assess the effects of liquidity and leverage requirements on banks’ financing decisions and insolvency risk. In this model, banks face taxation, issuance costs of securities, and default costs and maximize s
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Recent empirical studies show that innovative firms heavily rely on debt financing. Debt overhang implies that debt hampers innovation by incumbents. A second effect of debt is that it stimulates innovation by entrants. Using a Schumpeterian growth m
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We develop a model in which a startup firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is generally preferred to equity financing, unless the plat