Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 501
pro vyhledávání: '"Ernesto Dal Bó"'
Publikováno v:
American Political Science Review. 116:213-230
The rise of civilizations involved the dual emergence of economies that could produce surplus (“prosperity”) and states that could protect surplus (“security”). But the joint achievement of security and prosperity had to escape a paradox: pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ab5da2273e51fc67adbe360448b51081
https://doi.org/10.1017/s000305542100071x
https://doi.org/10.1017/s000305542100071x
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 89:677-701
Standard models of hierarchy assume that agents and middle managers are better informed than principals. We estimate the value of the informational advantage held by supervisors—middle managers—when ministerial leadership—the principal—introd
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e7143e63961117d153711e04df46b2ca
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17497
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17497
Autor:
Ernesto Dal Bó, Frederico Finan
Publikováno v:
Annual Review of Economics. 10:541-575
Full text and PDF of this article will be published in August 2018 We provide a model of self-selection by candidates in a probabilistic voting environment to shed light on the forces shaping the quality of politicians from both the supply and demand
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::75b4ca243205eaf6386bc3264841b18f
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053221
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053221
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economics. 141:38-49
We model religious faith as a “demand for beliefs,” following the logic of the Pascalian wager. We show how standard experimental interventions linking financial consequences to falsifiable religious statements can elicit and characterize beliefs
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::782d4e295bba17eb5de7062955da521b
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.07.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.07.004
Standard models of hierarchy assume that agents and middle managers are better informed than principals about how to implement a particular task. We estimate the value of the informational advantage held by supervisors – middle managers – when mi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e424759ad207e00c43d6b7bea6967294
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24879
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24879
Productive development policies (PDPs) are notoriously hard. They involve a daunting level of technical detail, require public-private collaboration, are in constant danger of capture, and demand time consistency hard to achieve in a politically vola
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f676f979fd71d668adca4edbd034b1ab
https://doi.org/10.18235/0001182
https://doi.org/10.18235/0001182
Autor:
Frederico Finan, Ernesto Dal Bó
We provide a model of self-selection by candidates in a probabilistic voting environment to shed light on the forces shaping the quality of politicians from both the supply and demand sides of poli...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f256d21dd1a4fa2fa9be9fa47265bb98
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24783
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24783
Most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians’ motives to supply bad policy, but voters may themselves be partially responsible by demanding bad policy. In this article, we posit that voters may
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::629b8ca69719585a770d51a9505c4350
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/74455/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/74455/