Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 75
pro vyhledávání: '"Erik Myin"'
Autor:
Erik Myin, Farid Zahnoun
Publikováno v:
Frontiers in Psychology, Vol 9 (2018)
The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how th
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b04e1cfffb5f4a91bb73636805ab5e47
Autor:
Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin
A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless.Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamica
Autor:
Erik Myin, Daniel D. Hutto
Publikováno v:
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
This paper responds to Alva Noë’s general critique of Radical Enactivism. In particular, it responds to his claim that Radical Enactivism denies experience, presence and the world. We clarify Radical Enactivism’s actual arguments and positive co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2024c0745dbdeb65527e5ee462ad2b0b
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09775-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09775-6
Autor:
Erik Myin, Ludger van Dijk
Publikováno v:
Topoi: an international review of philosophy
One can be reproached for not remembering. Remembering and forgetting shows who and what one values. Indeed, memory is constitutively normative. Theoretical approaches to memory should be sensitive to this normative character. We will argue that trad
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5181ef6940f66f823e9675fbdc8f785c
https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1854600151162165141
https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1854600151162165141
Autor:
Erik Myin, Daniel D. Hutto
The radically enactive, embodied view of cognition (REC) holds that cognition is not always and everywhere grounded in the manipulation of contentful representations. Arguments for REC have assumed that its opponents defend a substantive notion of re
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::999db66960f12c4dec22cd1fba26e10e
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190686673.003.0004
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190686673.003.0004
Autor:
Erik Myin
Publikováno v:
Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science
REC, or the radical enactive/embodied view of cognition makes a crucial distinction between basic and content-involving cognition. This paper clarifies REC's views on basic and content-involving cognition, and their relation by replying to a recent c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::accb1b51c1b9e8a61e1d9688deddca3e
https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1666690151162165141
https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1666690151162165141
Autor:
Erik Myin, Thomas van Es
Publikováno v:
The philosophy and science of predictive processing / Mendonça, Dina [edit.]
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e07ea63e097ac44e0fe0ab75b4425cce
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350099784.ch-001
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350099784.ch-001
Autor:
Erik Myin, Daniel D. Hutto
Publikováno v:
Philosophical explorations
This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c9f44cfaf02a90e39bf5b84b74a47dd5
https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2018.1478988
https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2018.1478988
Autor:
Erik Myin, Ludger van Dijk
Publikováno v:
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
Theorizing about perception is often motivated by a belief that without a way of ensuring that our perceptual experience correctly reflects the external world we cannot be sure that we perceive the world at all. Historically, coming up with a way of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1b4aed6cd2cd1c4a4154437b142e533e
https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1538920151162165141
https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1538920151162165141
Autor:
Ludger van Dijk, Erik Myin
Publikováno v:
Ecological psychology
In one common view, human activity is explained by neural processes, because these implement psychological functions that underlie overt behavior. In the ecological approach, such accounts are taken to be nonexplanatory, because they reify the phenom
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e42e2e07b9a2d4e9172c6298e2a26774
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/864b2e/161505_2021_06_12.pdf
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/864b2e/161505_2021_06_12.pdf