Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 92
pro vyhledávání: '"Eric T. Olson"'
Autor:
Eric T. Olson
Publikováno v:
TheoLogica, Vol 8, Iss 2 (2023)
If I am a material thing, there would seem to be such an entity as the matter now making me up. In that case the matter and I must be either one thing or two. This creates an awkward dilemma. If we’re one thing, then I have existed for billions of
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/dd262348ea3b4e71a421f619a38936a7
Autor:
Eric T. Olson
Transhumanists want to free us from the constraints imposed by our humanity by means of “uploading”: extracting information from the brain, transferring it to a computer, and using it to create a purely electronic person there. That is supposed t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e8db1e591d0a67ca25ee1621eaa44194
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190876371.003.0019
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190876371.003.0019
Autor:
Eric T. Olson
Publikováno v:
E. J. Lowe and Ontology ISBN: 9781003196341
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ad426ca8184329e5035142e2837f42ec
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003196341-15
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003196341-15
Autor:
Eric T. Olson
Publikováno v:
The Unity of a Person ISBN: 9781003154198
The Unity of a Person
The Unity of a Person
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0733fb6011162825883179fd2f9b488d
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003154198-3
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003154198-3
Autor:
Eric T. Olson, Karsten Witt
Publikováno v:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 49:419-434
Many philosophers say that the nature of personal identity has to do with narratives: the stories we tell about ourselves. While different narrativists address different questions of personal identity, some propose narrativist accounts of personal id
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1fca8dd01fcfe4341e58352105a582d5
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1486674
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1486674
Autor:
Eric T. Olson
Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cee859c129a6f3ca8445eb0528017044
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4511
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4511
Autor:
Eric T. Olson, Aaron Segal
Are we made entirely of matter, like sticks and stones? Or do we have a soul—a nonphysical entity—where our mental lives take place?The authors Eric T. Olson and Aaron Segal begin this accessible and wide-ranging debate by looking at the often-ov
Autor:
Eric T. Olson
Publikováno v:
Biological Identity
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d2754cad27718e71de396776d58aecb1
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351066389-4
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351066389-4
Autor:
Eric T. Olson, Karsten Witt
It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that thi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6968a6b597284af7b4f905d20755fb74
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/159376/8/AAM.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/159376/8/AAM.pdf