Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"Emmanouil Pountourakis"'
Autor:
Constantine Caramanis, Paul Dütting, Matthew Faw, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Orestis Papadigenopoulos, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Publikováno v:
33rd SODA 2022
Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2022)
Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)
Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2022)
Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)
We study single-sample prophet inequalities (SSPIs), i.e., prophet inequalities where only a single sample from each prior distribution is available. Besides a direct, and optimal, SSPI for the basic single choice problem [Rubinstein et al., 2020], m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::beb06a040532582972731967e60233ea
http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1636837
http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1636837
Publikováno v:
e-Energy
We propose a method to minimize the long-term cost of energy generation while improving grid stability. Currently, the cost of energy generation is minimized myopically (day by day) via the economic dispatch problem, which i) does not internalize the
Publikováno v:
e-Energy
Many current electricity rate structures for residential consumers do not provide proper incentives for consumer solar production. They also unfairly burden traditional consumers in favor of solar producing consumers ("prosumers"), by charging the bu
Publikováno v:
Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783030046118
WINE
WINE
One of the most celebrated results in mechanism design is Myerson’s characterization of the revenue optimal auction for selling a single item. However, this result relies heavily on the assumption that buyers are indifferent to risk. In this paper
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ed4a0184ff8c026f4fd9357a899f3e1c
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_25
Autor:
Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Ali Khodabakhsh, Ger Yang, Soumya Basu, Thanasis Lianeas, Michael C. Caramanis
Publikováno v:
HICSS
Distribution network reconfiguration (DNR) is a tool used by operators to balance line load flows and mitigate losses. As distributed generation and flexible load adoption increases, the impact of DNR on the security, efficiency, and reliability of t
Publikováno v:
EC
In a market with repeated sales of a single item to a single buyer, prior work has established the existence of a zero revenue perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the absence of a commitment device for the seller. This counter-intuitive outcome is the re
Autor:
Alexander V. Kononov, Dimitris Paparas, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos, Evripidis Bampis, Eric Angel
Publikováno v:
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Discrete Applied Mathematics, Elsevier, 2016, 211, pp.15-22. ⟨10.1016/j.dam.2016.04.017⟩
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2016, 211, pp.15-22. ⟨10.1016/j.dam.2016.04.017⟩
Discrete Applied Mathematics, Elsevier, 2016, 211, pp.15-22. ⟨10.1016/j.dam.2016.04.017⟩
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2016, 211, pp.15-22. ⟨10.1016/j.dam.2016.04.017⟩
International audience; We study the Max kk-colored clustering problem, where given an edge-colored graph with kk colors, we seek to color the vertices of the graph so as to find a clustering of the vertices maximizing the number (or the weight) of m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ba77daad7566a0a9bd4b38982d69065c
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01366446
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01366446
Publikováno v:
EC
Individuals working towards a goal often exhibit time inconsistent behavior, making plans and then failing to follow through. One well-known model of such behavioral anomalies is present-bias discounting: individuals over-weight present costs by a bi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4db75b2b6835fa22e46de8ce87f7573f
http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.03062
http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.03062
Publikováno v:
FOCS
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the second-price auction