Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 39
pro vyhledávání: '"Emma Moreno-García"'
Autor:
Marta Faias, Emma Moreno-García
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 115:58-63
We state and analyze a non-cooperative approach to the provision of public goods where agents decide simultaneously not only their private contribution but also their level of utilization which may differ among consumers (contributors and non-contrib
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 73:421-438
We provide a version of the Coase theorem within a general equilibrium framework. We consider an economy with other-regarding preferences, and where rights, licenses, or permissions are required to use, consume or transform some specific commodities.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Dynamics & Games. 7:65-77
In this work, we recapitulate and compare the market game approaches provided by Shapley and Shubik [ 35 ] and Schmeidler [ 33 ]. We provide some extensions to economies with infinitely many commodities and point out some applications and lines for f
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 69:125-147
We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware of the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, when joining a coalition, each consumer considers the informational risk and may be uncertain about the prior r
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 14:129-138
We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s (1979) veto and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations, providing a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas-Colell
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 166:10-13
We provide a notion of bargaining set for finite economies where the proponents of objections (leaders) are endogenous. We show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations when the economy is replicated.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 74:93-98
We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism a la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colel
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 66:327-341
We introduce a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations.
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 76:103-106
We obtain an analogue of the neutrality result of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) for economies with both multiple private and public goods.