TRRespass

Autor: Cristiano Giuffrida, Emanuele Vannacc, Pietro Frigo, Kaveh Razavi, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen, Herbert Bos, Onur Mutlu

Publikováno v: 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Frigo, P, Vannacci, E, Hassan, H, Der Veen, V V, Mutlu, O, Giuffrida, C, Bos, H & Razavi, K 2020, TRRespass : Exploiting the many sides of target row refresh . in 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) : Proceedings ., 9152631, Proceedings-IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, no. May, vol. 2020, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 747-762, 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2020, San Francisco, United States, 18/05/20 . https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40000.2020.00090
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP): Proceedings, 747-762
STARTPAGE=747;ENDPAGE=762;TITLE=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

After a plethora of high-profile RowHammer attacks, CPU and DRAM vendors scrambled to deliver what was meant to be the definitive hardware solution against the RowHammer problem: Target Row Refresh (TRR). A common belief among practitioners is that,

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::083e8c28528a97b5eebaef837c0d6f8e
https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40000.2020.00090