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pro vyhledávání: '"Elkind E"'
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3885
Akademický článek
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We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th largest c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1064::94ef78df61cc32d7852e4f91af57dfe6
https://doi.org/10.5555/3545946.3598878
https://doi.org/10.5555/3545946.3598878
Publikováno v:
Scopus-Elsevier
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, and therefore it is important to know under what conditions the core of a game is guaranteed to be non-empty. Two notions that prove to be very useful in this context are Linear Progr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::51b53eaf8c7fd1e46e6d90e961ff1769
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8256
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8256
Akademický článek
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Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Artificial Intelligence. 313:103783
We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be sufficiently separated from one another. This captures, for example, co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ce2a013b2959b05d1d2e96359972be9d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103783
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103783
Publikováno v:
Scopus-Elsevier
We propose a new variant of the group activity selection problem (GASP), where the agents are placed on a social network and activities can only be assigned to connected subgroups. We show that if multiple groups can simultaneously engage in the same
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8369725138503d06fc90e64fe993acc2
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62cbb793-1b0c-46bc-b731-7eaa407f1c63
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62cbb793-1b0c-46bc-b731-7eaa407f1c63
Recent work studied Stackelberg security games with multiple defenders, in which heterogeneous defenders allocate security resources to protect a set of targets against a strategic attacker. Equilibrium analysis was conducted to characterize outcomes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1064::e388abae2218f638ab091bc4d8757190
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ffd2386c-cebe-4b14-968a-9e71ed3320f9
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ffd2386c-cebe-4b14-968a-9e71ed3320f9
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we exten
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1064::453a00e41e9f725786ae7a484ce42c39
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9f4d97f6-7dd6-44fa-b6f4-f5d8808e44c6
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9f4d97f6-7dd6-44fa-b6f4-f5d8808e44c6