Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 118
pro vyhledávání: '"Ehud Lehrer"'
Autor:
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research. 48:834-864
Consider a stationary process taking values in a finite state space. Each state is associated with a finite one-shot zero-sum game. We investigate the infinitely repeated zero-sum game with incomplete information on one side in which the state of the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8395c03154f25d8c625be079270a7697
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1286
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1286
Autor:
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 14:1-24
This paper studies the impact of noisy signals on screening processes. It deals with a decision problem in which a decision-maker screens a set of elements based on noisy unbiased evaluations. Given that the decision-maker uses threshold strategies,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d20772cd44edc141c1bcc6884f93a74a
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200284
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200284
Autor:
Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5238530abfbdea81d223867ed75f97b0
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4424223
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4424223
Autor:
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research. 45:1153-1163
A sequence of random variables is exchangeable if the joint distribution of any finite subsequence is invariant to permutations. De Finetti’s representation theorem states that every exchangeable infinite sequence is a convex combination of indepen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c126fd22c2f84e60e763f8b7e9d98174
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1026
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1026
Autor:
Ehud Lehrer, Roee Teper
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 122:440-452
We study allocation problems when agents negotiate across different agendas. Unlike existing papers on multi-agenda disputes, we consider environments in which resources are constrained and investing (time or effort) in one agenda reduces the ability
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6ceb73befb7800e36e74e3b448d17368
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.008
Autor:
Ye Du, Ehud Lehrer
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 88:16-24
We investigate a dynamic decision making problem with constraints. The decision maker is free to take any action as long as the empirical frequency of the actions played does not violate pre-specified constraints. In a case of violation the decision
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::974d32a256ee406fd2469fda1451ab55
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.002
Autor:
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 71:483-504
We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, wher
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::48a284f55d57d83ee2525ef707160c11
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::86dcbec6ee210d578acc4983b7a22451
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4236322
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4236322
Autor:
Ehud Lehrer, Shiri Alon
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 118:60-71
The paper introduces an axiomatic characterization of a solution to bargaining problems. Bargaining problems are specified by: (a) the preference relations of the bargaining parties (b) resources that are the subject of bargaining, and (c) a pre-spec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c40fa73d8e5506544fe3954b216cadaa
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.006
Autor:
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review: Insights. 1:343-356
This paper deals with the issue of screening. It focuses on a decision maker who, based on noisy unbiased assessments, screens elements from a general set. Our analysis shows that stricter screening not only reduces the number of accepted elements, b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::89035cae2fa0b9c16a00354bcfe6a51d
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20180578
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20180578