Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 127
pro vyhledávání: '"Ehud Kalai"'
Autor:
Ronen Gradwohl, Ehud Kalai
Publikováno v:
Annual Review of Economics. 13:39-56
This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increas
Autor:
Ehud Kalai
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 127:iii-v
Autor:
Ehud Kalai, Eran Shmaya
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 178:59-81
The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group of interdependent players, diversified in their preferences and information. We study an i
Autor:
Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Jennifer Byrd, Ehud Kalai, David C. Parkes, Françoise Forges, Vincent P. Crawford
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 103:1-18
Autor:
Ewerhart, Christian 11I am grateful to Ehud Kalai, the editor in charge, and two anonymous referees. The paper benefited from discussions with Stephen Andrews, Dieter Balkenborg, Guy Haworth, Myron Lieberman, Martin Osborne, Jörn Rothe, Ulrich Schwalbe, and Bernhard von Stengel, and last but not least from the stimulating atmosphere of the First World Congress of the Game Theory Society in Bilbao.
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior May 2002 39(2):206-214
Autor:
Ehud Kalai, Joyee Deb
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 157:1041-1055
Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all eq
Autor:
Ehud Kalai
Publikováno v:
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics ISBN: 9781349951215
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ab8a5a6246d894f8962e9f71c6695e66
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2615
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2615
Autor:
Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai
Publikováno v:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 128:917-966
For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more tha
Autor:
Marx, Leslie M * * For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I thank two anonymous referees. For comments on the later draft, I thank three anonymous referees, an associate editor, and Ehud Kalai. I thank Paul Milgrom for encouraging me to pursue this topic and Eddie Dekel-Tabak and Jeroen Swinkels for helpful discussions and comments. The support of a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship and a Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship during work on this article is gratefully acknowledged. , † † E-mail:marx@ssb.rochester.edu.
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior 1999 26(2):253-278
Autor:
Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai
Publikováno v:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges. 10:13-16
Luminaries such as Nash (1953), Raiffa (1953), and Selten (1960), studied cooperation in two-person strategic games. We point out that when players may make monetary side payments, i.e., bimatrix games with transferable utility (TU), all previous sol