Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 92
pro vyhledávání: '"Eguia, Jon X."'
Autor:
Eguia, Jon X., Immorlica, Nicole, Lalley, Steven P., Ligett, Katrina, Weyl, Glen, Xefteris, Dimitrios
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not r
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.06206
Autor:
Eguia, Jon X., Xefteris, Dimitrios
Publikováno v:
In European Economic Review November 2024 170
Autor:
Eguia, Jon X., Xefteris, Dimitrios
Publikováno v:
The American Economic Review, 2021 Sep 01. 111(9), 2811-2828.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27086094
Autor:
Eguia, Jon X.
I study how a group of agents with incomplete information about their conflicting preferences make a collective decision by means of voting. I present a model of representative democracy with citizen candidates in which the set of agents who runs for
Externí odkaz:
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/1199/1/thesis050407.pdf
Autor:
Eguia, Jon X., Xefteris, Dimitrios
Publikováno v:
Public Choice, 2019 Apr 01. 179(1/2), 41-49.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48704292
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior May 2018 109:465-483
Autor:
Câmara, Odilon, Eguia, Jon X.
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics, 2017 Oct 01. 79(4), 1460-1464.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26551102