Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 18
pro vyhledávání: '"Effrosyni Diamantoudi"'
Publikováno v:
Strategic Behavior and the Environment. 8:269-310
This paper examines the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an economy with trade. We extent the basic model of the IEAs by letting countries choose emission taxes and import tariffs as their policy instruments in order to m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7548531185d2bda24a25044d074e02b4
https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000096
https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000096
Publikováno v:
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), ICREA Academia We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and exte
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ba7237cff4556d3ef0b79babd4066d5b
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/414199
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/414199
Publikováno v:
Environmental and Resource Economics. 71:241-257
The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the cooperative and the non-cooperative approach employed to examine the size of stable coalitions, formed to address global environmental problems. We do so by endowing countries with foresightedn
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3c32b4ac5ad488f8fca4f5bb3a85890e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0148-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0148-1
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The present paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries in a two-stage emission game. In the first stage, each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::043621dab4f790e2a18864b2fe332caa
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3209170
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3209170
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each count
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bc361ab03b30341651c0893145422843
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3186002
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3186002
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 92:1-17
The two-sided matching literature has focused on static and centralized games. However, in many markets, the matching is determined in decentralized fashion and continues to change. This paper considers infinitely-repeated matching games, where firms
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::592eb9ab524fe5e7762ff8c3f7e7e73f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.002
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 59:527-546
We examine the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We extend the existing literature by endogenizing the reaction of the IEA’s members to a deviation by a group of members. We assume that when a group of countries contemplat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::af93bf78a9f246181ed0480dcd943ee5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0837-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0837-8
Autor:
Francis Bloch, Effrosyni Diamantoudi
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 40:263-280
We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend solely on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6d7a1122dfda31e1d561d321a842a750
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0237-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0237-7
Autor:
Effrosyni Diamantoudi
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 22:431-446
This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::677aae5d9003db184673a8dfda35197e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z