Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Eduardo A. Barrio"'
Autor:
Romina Padró, Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 42, Iss 2, Pp 205-211 (2022)
¿Podemos adoptar una regla de inferencia como si fuera una hipótesis e inferir algo en virtud de esa regla? ¿Podemos revisar nuestras reglas y principios lógicos en virtud de la evidencia disponible? El antiexcepcionalismo lógico desafía la ide
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/2487c38d025540f78c60412c77803dcb
Autor:
Romina Padró, Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 42, Iss 1, Pp 33-41 (2022)
¿Seguimos reglas de inferencia al razonar? Por más intuitiva que resulte la respuesta positiva a esta pregunta, hay una serie de dificultades para vincular reglas lógicas y prácticas inferenciales. El Problema de la Adopción de Reglas de Inferen
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/04bd7c5c99b74cc586c2c03b19f4a0f8
Autor:
Eduardo A. Barrio, Federico Pailos
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 41, Iss 2, Pp 261-272 (2021)
The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to id
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/89a56f1dd8944de0a38009934a7fc58c
Autor:
Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 42, Iss 2, Pp 203-203 (2022)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4b7e8abc280b4a3a86201cd929216a4d
Autor:
Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 32, Iss 1, Pp 7-20 (2012)
In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/43f9c373be5a4450a111a610b22a8d9a
Autor:
Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 31, Iss 1, Pp 7-32 (2011)
En este artículo, tengo dos objetivos distintos. En primer lugar, mostrar que no es una buena idea tener una teoría de la verdad que, aunque consistente, sea omega-inconsistente. Para discutir este punto, considero un caso particular: la teoría de
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d5a5210b1cc64423a2246c895b02661f
Autor:
Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 18, Iss 2, Pp 151-157 (1999)
In this paper I criticize Comesaña's point of view on Putnam's model-theoretic argument. I claim that there is an interesting point made by the argument that Comesaña has not taken into account: if we want our semantic assertions to be at ali justi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e465297990ac41a9aab8b12cd57f08b0
Autor:
Eduardo A. Barrio
Publikováno v:
Análisis Filosófico, Vol 32, Iss 1, Pp 5-5 (2012)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1a475a66b1064b0e9b130bc84de34d9b
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 199:12561-12586
Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::060df86e8886158ed0943c1fa4a9a580
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03343-w
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03343-w
Publikováno v:
Journal of Philosophical Logic. 51:75-98
It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. (Jour
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2ab4646baeacc54cfd3daa7db0478fdd
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09610-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09610-y