Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Earlenbaugh, Joshua"'
Autor:
Earlenbaugh, Joshua, Molyneux, Bernard
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 2009 Jul 01. 145(1), 89-109.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27734467
Autor:
Earlenbaugh, Joshua1
Publikováno v:
Metascience. Jul2008, Vol. 17 Issue 2, p315-318. 4p.
Autor:
Climenhaga, Nevin1 nclimenh@nd.edu
Publikováno v:
Mind. Jan2018, Vol. 127 Issue 505, p69-104. 36p.
Autor:
BENGSON, JOHN1 bengson@wisc.edu
Publikováno v:
Mind. Jul2015, Vol. 124 Issue 495, p707-760. 54p.
Autor:
Molyneux, Bernard1 molyneux@ucdavis.edu
Publikováno v:
Metaphilosophy. Jul2014, Vol. 45 Issue 3, p441-461. 21p.
Autor:
Eklund, Matti1 me72@cornell.edu
Publikováno v:
Metaphilosophy. Apr2013, Vol. 44 Issue 3, p276-292. 17p.
Autor:
HALES, STEVEN D.1
Publikováno v:
Analytic Philosophy. Jun2012, Vol. 53 Issue 2, p180-207. 28p.
Autor:
Nado, Jennifer
Publikováno v:
Inquiry; May2017, Vol. 60 Issue 4, p386-402, 17p
Autor:
Monseré, Annelies
Publikováno v:
Inquiry; Oct-Nov2015, Vol. 58 Issue 7/8, p806-827, 22p
Autor:
Joshua Earlenbaugh, Bernard Molyneux
Publikováno v:
Earlenbaugh, Joshua; & Molyneux, Bernard. (2009). Intuitions are inclinations to believe. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 145(1), pp 89-109. doi: 10.1007/s11098-009-9388-4. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/37s5s03m
Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds o