Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 56
pro vyhledávání: '"E. Schnakenberg"'
Autor:
Amanda Kennard, Keith E. Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
Global Environmental Politics. 23:133-144
In Global Environmental Politics (“Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change,” 20 (4): 4–27), Michaël Aklin and Matto Mildenberger argue against the prevailin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b507cb7866daa4ae196df8627de00cbd
https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_c_00699
https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_c_00699
Publikováno v:
American Political Science Review. 116:751-767
Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have “directional motives” beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill equipped to hold p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1516a350533bf788f4129045e15a2cf8
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055421001209
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055421001209
Publikováno v:
International Organization. 76:469-486
We analyze the design of an international climate agreement. In particular, we consider two goals of such an agreement: overcoming free-rider problems and adjusting for differences in mitigation costs between countries. Previous work suggests that it
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::20bdd3ee6b66a2e171404b6167f71d80
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818321000400
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818321000400
Autor:
Ian R. Turner, Keith E. Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
American Political Science Review. 113:762-777
Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policy-makers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of noncorrupt politicians to enlist the help
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::213261f3a932d78e3f375dad42d0882a
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000169
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000169
Autor:
Keith E. Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
Political Science Research and Methods. 9:206-214
We analyze a two-election political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection in which candidates have observable traits such as job qualifications that help voters to imperfectly predict politicians' types. Candidate's traits can help vot
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::94a0c7f3ad1bc8aa23719a664c0c74f0
https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.6
https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.6
Autor:
Keith E. Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 173:43-59
I analyze a model of information transmission in collective choice environments. An Expert possesses private information about the consequences of passing an exogenous proposal and engages in cheap talk to persuade voters to pass or reject the propos
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5f1bfee4faa6f3072605b8acc25836ba
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0462-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0462-8
Autor:
E Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
Das Gesundheitswesen. 79:299-374
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cf5c284b6efe280f188f4ae2a9d975f2
https://doi.org/10.1055/s-0037-1601899
https://doi.org/10.1055/s-0037-1601899
Publikováno v:
Economics & Politics. 29:118-132
We present a model of executive-legislative bargaining over appointments to independent cen-tral banks in the face of an uncertain economy with strategic economic actors. The model highlights the contrast between two idealized views of Federal Reserv
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0e869d20b93ee96a614c2af5745ec9e5
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12089
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12089
Autor:
Keith E. Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 61:129-145
I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d4cad14470102753446828a47bc82b7e
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12249
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12249
Autor:
Keith E. Schnakenberg
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics. 78:527-541
Can campaign communications credibly transmit information about candidates' policy intentions? To answer this question, I develop and analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign communication in a two-candidate majority rule election with multidimensi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a90de5d684e8e88c6ce3147681eeadd9
https://doi.org/10.1086/684367
https://doi.org/10.1086/684367