Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 65
pro vyhledávání: '"Dov Monderer"'
Autor:
Dov Monderer, William H. Ruckle
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences, Vol 13, Iss 1, Pp 165-169 (1990)
In this paper, a weaker version of the Symmetry Axiom on BV, and values on subspaces of BV are discussed. Included are several theorems and examples.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a6a3d3b09bd7407689e896031a1f6a0f
Autor:
Vulkan, Nir **E-mail: N. Vulkan@bristol.ac.uk. I thank Ian Jewitt, In-Uck Park, Sjaak Hurkens, and Dov Monderer for helpful comments. Financial support from the EPSRC Award GR MO7052 is gratefully acknowledged.
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior April 2001 35(1-2):339-348
Autor:
Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 44:647-666
A network congestion game is played on a directed, two-terminal network. Every player chooses a route from his origin to his destination. The cost of a route is the sum of the costs of the arcs on it. The arc cost is a function of the number of playe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6d43ea5c8285f5a4b8138dad3b2ed5ec
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0448-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0448-4
Publikováno v:
MIT web domain
We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::12202dce9f7c4b4883d283bef71be6ec
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0475
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0475
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 78:1749-1772
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::be44ba1cdaa0afc2fbd11395a3d16ae4
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8882
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8882
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 67:2-21
A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::97fb8b91d2c0318e8695ca96eebfcd44
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.005
Autor:
Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
Publikováno v:
Artificial Intelligence. 171:448-452
We argue that learning equilibrium is an appropriate generalization to multi-agent systems of the concept of learning to optimize in single-agent setting. We further define and discuss the concept of weak learning equilibrium.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cd7b93c6664b62adce582f24e7f7eb9c
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.002
Autor:
Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 24:255-270
This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auction design in symmetric equilibrium of k-price auctions, \(k\ge 1\), all in the setup of symmetric independent-private-value auctions. Our recommendatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f38e8969247a655699d202c89021ab94
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0424-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0424-x
Autor:
Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 47:87-103
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzma
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6213eb48a55cd3a9acda314a330c4cea
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 35:1-5
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::da720fe9c4fca5555b4c581f6b3b2587
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0848
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0848