Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 22
pro vyhledávání: '"Doron Levit"'
Autor:
Doron Levit, Anton Tsoy
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 14:318-347
One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3ef238063be6bdc243aa805e5a2d8b6e
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200138
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200138
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 137:152-178
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership shifts managers’ incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a ma
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::33479148d7a519ba1a52faabfff2ccc5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.12.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.12.006
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d4feb547c7d14fcf2c3f76f4cd318131
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4093518
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4093518
Autor:
Zohar Goshen, Doron Levit
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The last forty years have seen two major economic trends: Wages have stalled despite rising productivity, and institutional investors have replaced retail shareholders as the predominant owners of the American equity markets. A few powerful instituti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4a75fa96f93e42aa4a24b632226c10a6
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3832069
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3832069
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. It explains how and why a voting premium emerges in the absence of takeovers and controlling shareholders. The model features a minority blockholder and dispersed
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e300f7a3b068f9eebdc291d3b10df7ab
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759761
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759761
Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading an investor too thinly. We show that, when an investor owns multiple firms (“common ownership”), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen – even if the fir
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::24b03170001f131060ef7a0b8f2b0899
Autor:
Zohar Goshen, Doron Levit
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers’ incentive to invest (strong governance tightens
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2dca497463b73c004696c4da32e0cd55
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340912
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340912
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2b468d3667e68cc487c4d5165ed9c3eb
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3463129
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3463129
Autor:
Nadya Malenko, Doron Levit
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 71:775-808
This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and governance in turn affects firms' demand for new directors. Whether th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::070c7c6d52a02aa939366ccf1e648d3e
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12287
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12287