Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 14
pro vyhledávání: '"Doron Klunover"'
Autor:
Arthur Fishman, Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Journal of Government and Economics, Vol 10, Iss , Pp 100076- (2023)
We present a model in which an imperfectly informed politician chooses between appointing an independent expert, whose advice is revealed to voters, and a loyal expert whose advice can be concealed from voters and who can therefore be blamed for a ba
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9dc312a08a0547de82d52a3002807437
Autor:
Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 113:164-168
What are the chances of an ethical individual rising through the ranks of a political party or a corporation in the presence of unethical peers? To answer this question, I consider a four-player two-stage elimination tournament, in which players are
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e1734915ce0697cf4f04d63c4c67c1c2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.002
Autor:
Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 106:102841
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::58627bbb9dcdc25066712164c07ba06d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102841
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102841
Autor:
Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 168:90-93
Rent dissipation is a measure of the social loss in rent-seeking contests and therefore is the main source of interest in the rent-seeking literature. We derive narrow bounds for the amount of rent dissipation in a sequential lottery contest with n i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::658175e2dc8197ae094de162a1b90aed
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.025
Autor:
Nava Kahana, Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 163:126-129
We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players to show that, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b50c46a44be97317f011af53f71dee7a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010
Autor:
Nava Kahana, Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 47:379-386
When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f5a9345f789f713f596745ef04dee47d
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0968-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0968-x
Autor:
John Morgan, Doron Klunover
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 196:109559
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c60fb809ad3a02ffefdb4f824cf4d819
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109559
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109559
Autor:
Doron Klunover, Artyom Jelnov
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 192:109225
We consider a two-stage model, in which n players with the same preferences and different incomes compete for a common value prize and then contribute to a pure public good. We derive the sufficient and necessary condition under which there exists a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::176d6f698f9fba70acbd39a6dc9f6492
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109225
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109225
Autor:
Doron Klunover, Nava Kahana
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 165:97-102
We apply the environmental equivalence property of Poisson games (Myerson, In Int J Game Theory 27:375–392, 1998b) to show that, in contests in which the number of contestants is a Poisson random variable with at least two expected contestants and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a913a8123210a7befbd6474c526b3e4b
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0295-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0295-2