Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying And Discretionary Finance: Evidence From India

Autor: Rongili Biswas, Sugata Marjit, Velayoudom Marimoutou

Publikováno v: Economics and Politics
Economics and Politics, Wiley, 2010, 22 (1), pp.68-91. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00363.x⟩
Economics and Politics, 2010, 22 (1), pp.68-91. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00363.x⟩

International audience; In the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central funds by the states is often done in a subliminal fashion. Hence, it becomes difficult to get an account of how much lobbying has been done to a parti

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a646efe2b58bd66a501a9e3bdc3a4f00
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03237540