Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 30
pro vyhledávání: '"Dieter Balkenborg"'
Publikováno v:
German Economic Review. 20:52-66
Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence
Autor:
Dieter Balkenborg
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 110:248-257
In a model of modal logic it is shown that the assumptions of rationality and intelligence of the players imply that only rationalizable strategies can be played. Nothing more can be inferred from these rules. Hereby the assumption of “intelligence
Autor:
Rosemarie Nagel, Dieter Balkenborg
Publikováno v:
German Economic Review. 17:378-408
We report the experimental results on a game with an outside option where forward induction contradicts with backward induction based on a focal, risk dominant equilibrium. The latter procedure yields the equilibrium selected by Harsanyi and Selten
Autor:
Dries Vermeulen, Dieter Balkenborg
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research, 41(1), 278-292. Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
A minimal diversity game is an n player strategic form game in which each player has m pure strategies at his disposal. The payoff to each player is always 1, unless all players select the same pure strategy, in which case, all players receive zero p
Autor:
Ewerhart, Christian 11I am grateful to Ehud Kalai, the editor in charge, and two anonymous referees. The paper benefited from discussions with Stephen Andrews, Dieter Balkenborg, Guy Haworth, Myron Lieberman, Martin Osborne, Jörn Rothe, Ulrich Schwalbe, and Bernhard von Stengel, and last but not least from the stimulating atmosphere of the First World Congress of the Game Theory Society in Bilbao.
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior May 2002 39(2):206-214
Autor:
Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 67-76. Elsevier Science
We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game—a game where all players have two pure strategies and a common util
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Economic Education. 43:377-385
The hold-up problem is central to the theory of incomplete contracts. It shows how the difficulty to write complete contracts and the resulting need to renegotiate can lead to underinvestment. We describe the design of a simple teaching experiment th
Publikováno v:
Ishizaka, A, Balkenborg, D & Kaplan, T 2011, ' Does AHP help us make a choice? an experimental evaluation ', Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 62, no. 10, pp. 1801-1812 . https://doi.org/10.1057/jors.2010.158
In this paper, we use experimental economics methods to test how well Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) fares as a choice support system in a real decision problem. AHP provides a ranking that we statistically compare with three additional rankings gi
Publikováno v:
Ishizaka, A, Balkenborg, D & Kaplan, T 2011, ' Influence of aggregation and measurement scale on ranking a compromise alternative in AHP ', Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 700-710 . https://doi.org/10.1057/jors.2010.23
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of the most popular multi-attribute decision aid methods. However, within AHP, there are several competing preference measurement scales and aggregation techniques. In this paper, we compare these possibilities
Autor:
Todd R. Kaplan, Dieter Balkenborg
Publikováno v:
International Review of Economics Education. 9:99-106
Economic classroom experiments are an excellent way to increase student interest, but getting started may be difficult. We attempt to aid the newcomer by recommending which experiments to use and describing the current resources available.