Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 140
pro vyhledávání: '"Devanur, Nikhil R."'
Autor:
Wang, Xintong, Pennock, David M., Devanur, Nikhil R., Rothschild, David M., Tao, Biaoshuai, Wellman, Michael P.
Financial options are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price by an expiration date. Standard exchanges offer options of predetermined strike values and trade options of different strikes independently, e
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2109.06443
Autor:
Tarnawski, Jakub, Phanishayee, Amar, Devanur, Nikhil R., Mahajan, Divya, Paravecino, Fanny Nina
Modern machine learning workloads use large models, with complex structures, that are very expensive to execute. The devices that execute complex models are becoming increasingly heterogeneous as we see a flourishing of domain-specific accelerators b
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.16423
We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in Bergemann et al. (2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design market segments to maximize any linear combination of consumer surplus
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05770
We study a new model of complementary valuations, which we call "proportional complementarities." In contrast to common models, such as hypergraphic valuations, in our model, we do not assume that the extra value derived from owning a set of items is
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.00788
We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, the players bring one unit of their good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets allocated in propo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05037
We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at every step. We design a single algorithm that, for every possible unde
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1903.03944
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers [HN12], and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand bidders [CHK07]. Ad
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1812.01577
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior July 2022 134:344-360
We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best fixed p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.09700
In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for $n$ units of the item is $v \min \{ n, d\} $, where the per unit valuation $v$ and the capacity $d$ are private information of the buyer. We cons
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.05027