Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 37
pro vyhledávání: '"Denter, Philipp"'
Autor:
Denter, Philipp, Ginzburg, Boris
Political agents often aim to influence elections through troll farms -- organisations that disseminate messages emulating genuine information. We study the behaviour of a troll farm that faces a heterogeneous electorate of partially informed voters,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.03241
Autor:
Denter, Philipp
Two office-driven politicians compete in an election by proposing policies. There are two possible states of the world: climate change is either mild, with no lasting effect on welfare if addressed properly, or severe, leading to reduced welfare even
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.20982
Autor:
Sisak, Dana, Denter, Philipp
We study how social image concerns affect information sharing patterns between peers. An individual receives a signal ("news") about the state of the world and can either share it with a peer or not. This signal has two attributes: a headline -- e.g.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.19557
Autor:
Denter, Philipp, Sisak, Dana
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Public Economics October 2015 130:1-14
Autor:
Denter, Philipp1 (AUTHOR), Dumav, Martin1 (AUTHOR), Ginzburg, Boris1 (AUTHOR) bginzbur@eco.uc3m.es
Publikováno v:
Economic Journal. Jul2021, Vol. 131 Issue 637, p2033-2057. 25p. 1 Diagram, 1 Graph.
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 14(1), 529-580. American Economic Association
We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::394bb40356799538e6dad164e5b3e727
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/415b506e-e46b-481d-a2a4-314e00a799c1
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/415b506e-e46b-481d-a2a4-314e00a799c1
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
instname
We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c1aac62f9714063c8f1b08eee63ae95f
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190234
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190234
Autor:
Denter, Philipp
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
instname
I develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psy
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b3fb060cd5200a9e5a3d4df22e3939bf
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3495106
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3495106