Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"Deimen, Inga"'
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory October 2022 205
Autor:
Deimen, Inga, Szalay, Dezsö
Publikováno v:
AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2019 May 01. 109, 545-549.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26724005
Autor:
Deimen, Inga, Szalay, Dezső
Publikováno v:
The American Economic Review, 2019 Apr 01. 109(4), 1349-1374.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26637208
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory December 2015 160:24-35
Autor:
Szalay, Dezsö, Deimen, Inga
Two divisions of a firm, overarched by a headquarters, are engaged in a decision problem. Division one obtains information and informs division two who has the formal authority to make the decision. Headquarters guides the decision process by affecti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::ccc73b44295b0526e5027f79bdb42be2
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145668
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145668
Autor:
Deimen, Inga, Wirtz, Julia
We analyze a new type of bandit where an agent is confronted with two-dimensional uncertainty. The agent does not know whether ability or effort is required to succeed at a given task. Moreover, the agent does not know her own ability level. In each
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::a5b41bd6e7e77743b343539426629034
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145931
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145931
Autor:
Deimen, Inga, Szalay, Dezsö
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistica
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::9e523b0d5d11fad466aeefe354ba3467
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21603/1/479.pdf
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21603/1/479.pdf
Autor:
Deimen, Inga, Szalay, Dezso
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistica
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::074f95316e76614ec69a7578f18161b3
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100333/1/VfS_2014_pid_867.pdf
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100333/1/VfS_2014_pid_867.pdf