Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 48
pro vyhledávání: '"Deian Stefan"'
Autor:
Alexandra E. Michael, Anitha Gollamudi, Jay Bosamiya, Evan Johnson, Aidan Denlinger, Craig Disselkoen, Conrad Watt, Bryan Parno, Marco Patrignani, Marco Vassena, Deian Stefan
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages. 7:425-454
Most programs compiled to WebAssembly (Wasm) today are written in unsafe languages like C and C++. Unfortunately, memory-unsafe C code remains unsafe when compiled to Wasm—and attackers can exploit buffer overflows and use-after-frees in Wasm almos
Autor:
Shravan Narayan, Tal Garfinkel, Mohammadkazem Taram, Joey Rudek, Daniel Moghimi, Evan Johnson, Chris Fallin, Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Michael LeMay, Ravi Sahita, Dean Tullsen, Deian Stefan
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 28th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 3.
Autor:
Matthew Kolosick, Shravan Narayan, Evan Johnson, Conrad Watt, Michael LeMay, Deepak Garg, Ranjit Jhala, Deian Stefan
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
49th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages
49th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages
Software sandboxing or software-based fault isolation (SFI) is a lightweight approach to building secure systems out of untrusted components. Mozilla, for example, uses SFI to harden the Firefox browser by sandboxing third-party libraries, and compan
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cc0edfeb948570db2ec2803d07929dbf
https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0009-B26B-621.11116/0000-0009-CB9F-021.11116/0000-0009-B269-8
https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0009-B26B-621.11116/0000-0009-CB9F-021.11116/0000-0009-B269-8
Publikováno v:
CCS
Content blocking systems today exempt thousands of privacy-harming scripts. They do this because blocking these scripts breaks the Web sites that rely on them. In this paper, we address this privacy/functionality trade-off with SugarCoat, a tool that
Publikováno v:
CCS
von Gleissenthall, K, Klcl, R G, Stefan, D & Jhala, R 2021, Solver-Aided Constant-Time Hardware Verification . in CCS 2021 : Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security . Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, vol. 2021, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 429-444, 27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021, Virtual, Online, Korea, Republic of, 15/11/21 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484810
CCS 2021: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 429-444
STARTPAGE=429;ENDPAGE=444;TITLE=CCS 2021
von Gleissenthall, K, Klcl, R G, Stefan, D & Jhala, R 2021, Solver-Aided Constant-Time Hardware Verification . in CCS 2021 : Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security . Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, vol. 2021, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 429-444, 27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021, Virtual, Online, Korea, Republic of, 15/11/21 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484810
CCS 2021: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 429-444
STARTPAGE=429;ENDPAGE=444;TITLE=CCS 2021
We present Xenon, a solver-aided, interactive method for formally verifying that Verilog hardware executes in constant-time. Xenon scales to realistic hardware designs by drastically reducing the effort needed to localize the root cause of verificati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::af858411b27c9ac547e3c199a2642396
https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484810
https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484810
Publikováno v:
2021 IEEE Secure Development Conference (SecDev).
Publikováno v:
PLDI
Web applications often handle large amounts of sensitive user data. Modern secure web frameworks protect this data by (1) using declarative languages to specify security policies alongside database schemas and (2) automatically enforcing these polici
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages. 3:1-31
We show that fine-grained and coarse-grained dynamic information-flow control (IFC) systems are equally expressive. To this end, we mechanize two mostly standard languages, one with a fine-grained dynamic IFC system and the other with a coarse-graine
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, 3(POPL):59, 1-30. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
von Gleissenthal, K, Klcl, R G, Bakst, A, Stefan, D & Jhala, R 2019, ' Pretend synchrony: synchronous verification of asynchronous distributed programs ', Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, vol. 3, no. POPL, 59, pp. 1-30 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3290372
von Gleissenthal, K, Klcl, R G, Bakst, A, Stefan, D & Jhala, R 2019, ' Pretend synchrony: synchronous verification of asynchronous distributed programs ', Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, vol. 3, no. POPL, 59, pp. 1-30 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3290372
We present pretend synchrony , a new approach to verifying distributed systems, based on the observation that while distributed programs must execute asynchronously, we can often soundly treat them as if they were synchronous when verifying their cor
Autor:
Shravan Narayan, Yousef Alhessi, Evan Johnson, Deian Stefan, Sorin Lerner, David Thien, Stefan Savage, Fraser Brown, Tyler McMullen
Publikováno v:
NDSS