Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"David Wettstein"'
Autor:
Israel Luski, David Wettstein
Publikováno v:
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Vol 2, Iss 1 (2004)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cd9659ae642a435da6f747df2944184c
Publikováno v:
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::626347c26d884b4b4fb8d3f2464d8bb3
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/414193
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/414193
Publikováno v:
Handbook of the Shapley Value ISBN: 9781351241410
Shapley (1953a) formulates his proposal of a value for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form, that is, for games where the re- sources every group of players has available to distribute among its members only dep
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4617a11e025eefd5c7a32352961581c1
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351241410-8
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351241410-8
Autor:
David Wettstein, David Pérez-Castrillo
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 57:881-914
We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0159a7a20f9d905a27ec5f3372621c95
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12179
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12179
Autor:
Mridu Prabal Goswami, David Wettstein
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 44:60-67
In practice, procurement auctions often involve subjective evaluations of bids, especially when consisting of quality or design parameters which are hard to quantify. We formally define a notion of subjectivity in an auction environment and analyze t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::00b6303ec2e8bd8d590a4538b77cfe7b
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.001
Autor:
David Wettstein, Hodaya Lampert
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 69:102580
We study sequential innovation in two pyramidal structures, in which patent pools are socially desirable. Patent pools are stable, in a regular pyramid structure but not in an inverse pyramid structure under a standard pool formation process. We prop
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ca99e4828c643a2c7b56158052655823
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102580
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102580
Autor:
Todd R. Kaplan, David Wettstein
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 19:327-339
Using contests to generate innovation has been and is widely used. Such contests often involve offering a prize that depends upon the accomplishment (effort). Using an all-pay auction as a model of a contest, we determine the optimal reward for induc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::08920d2682d08c9a937145e129f39ecc
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0179-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0179-4
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 236-254. Academic Press Inc.
This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2a3abbbc99099f2a245e2d443c5b41f6
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.011
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.011
Autor:
Todd R. Kaplan, David Wettstein
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Many grant applications have a preliminary stage where only a select group are invited to submit a full application. Similarly, procurement contracts by governments are often awarded through a two-stage procedure. We model and analyze such environmen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f54d82c9011fb173278d52e7a653c435
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835271
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835271
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3c8289c6b0bde0b2efc26f482bdf071a
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2827508
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2827508