Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 19
pro vyhledávání: '"David Schoenherr"'
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 15:292-318
Exploiting an unemployment insurance reform in Brazil, we study incentive effects of UI in the presence of informal labor markets. We find that eligibility for UI benefits increases formal layoffs by 11 percent. Most of the additional layoffs are rel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6ed79539d6aad3f07b1679ecb380e1ee
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200787
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200787
Autor:
Terry Moon, David Schoenherr
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 145:970-1005
We document that networks that gain access to political power and use it for patronage appointments also gain control over resource allocation in the private sector. Specifically, following a presidential election in Korea, the president appoints mem
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8cb3cf5ed1db6b6c95d4f47bc2d3f295
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.014
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.014
Autor:
DAVID SCHOENHERR, JAN STARMANS
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 77:2669-2717
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7d63797ca03801be4e55c4f1919ca0df
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13171
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13171
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::911a45ac8b072aa795203246783d1c26
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4276837
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4276837
Autor:
David Schoenherr
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 74:543-586
Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents that politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winni
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::776995045d37fbe6294753fbb297fe93
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12751
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12751
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We assess the employment and income effects of access to credit dedicated to investment in individual mobility (a motorcycle). For identification, we exploit random time-series variation in access to credit through random lotteries for participants i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b0a6b376af3f142ea7e377187ef8712f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800020
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800020
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy
We employ a unique dataset on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a62c0b9c634822487e27b0a0c51f6f56
https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/977/1/VigV_rent_seeking_JPE.pdf
https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/977/1/VigV_rent_seeking_JPE.pdf
Autor:
Terry Moon, David Schoenherr
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The misallocation of government resources to the politically connected is considered to impose substantial economic costs. We document that resource misallocation to the politically connected extends to resources allocated by private sector firms. Fo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3a95e31220db6af8682dcecd3e01a89c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3270613
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3270613
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Exploiting an unemployment insurance (UI) reform in Brazil, we study incentive effects of UI in the presence of informal labor markets. We find that eligibility for UI benefits increases formal layoffs by twelve percent. Most of the additional formal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8ac0d71c847f7ad1bb4dba4ca2741287
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168769
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168769
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies. 28:1810-1847
We study distress risk premia around a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress from debtholders to shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The reform effect is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::998d73441a89877d98201a30afb5130d
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv009
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv009