Agency theory meets matching theory

Autor: Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publikováno v: SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Vol 12, Iss 1, Pp 1-33 (2020)

Abstract The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the e

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/41f1c1d59bf44daeb03ef88c4a59dc6a

Early individual stakeholders, first venture capital investment, and exit in the UK startup ecosystem

Autor: Albert Banal-Estañol, Inés Macho-Stadler, Jonás Nieto-Postigo, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publikováno v: Journal of Corporate Finance. 80:102420

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::34032ba772fa69ad4787eddbf9ff7956
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102420

Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game

Autor: David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor

Publikováno v: Games and Economic Behavior. 114:177-192

The multiple partners game ( Sotomayor, 1992 ) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature o

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2af514b5a8cb084509e6b8e46057f7d5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

Autor: Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Licun Xue

Publikováno v: Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), ICREA Academia We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and exte

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ba7237cff4556d3ef0b79babd4066d5b
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/414199

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

Autor: David Pérez-Castrillo, Inés Macho-Stadler, David Wettstein

Publikováno v: Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::626347c26d884b4b4fb8d3f2464d8bb3
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/414193