Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 23
pro vyhledávání: '"David O. Lucca"'
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 77:1685-1736
Publikováno v:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 136:1719-1781
Long-term nominal interest rates are surprisingly sensitive to high-frequency (daily or monthly) movements in short-term rates. Since 2000, this high-frequency sensitivity has grown even stronger in U.S. data. By contrast, the association between low
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 129:607-645
The use of order-flow information by financial firms has come to the forefront of the regulatory debate. Should a dealer who acquires information by taking client orders be allowed to use or share ...
Autor:
David O. Lucca, Jonathan H. Wright
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Emanuel Moench, David O. Lucca
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 70:329-371
We document large average excess returns on U.S. equities in anticipation of monetary policy decisions made at scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the past few decades. These pre-FOMC returns have increased over time and
The use of order flow information by financial firms has come to the forefront of the regulatory debate. A central question is: Should a dealer who acquires information by taking client orders be allowed to use or share that information? We explore h
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::26274bd9978c10291fba5dc592b33525
https://doi.org/10.3386/w22461
https://doi.org/10.3386/w22461
We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model distinguishing supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aac45f9698cf0a96ed3f29d63c354a2a
https://doi.org/10.3386/w22201
https://doi.org/10.3386/w22201
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 78(2):458-486
We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from ab
Autor:
Thomas M. Eisenbach, Andrew Haughwout, Beverly Hirtle, Anna Kovner, David O. Lucca, Matthew C. Plosser
The Federal Reserve is responsible for the prudential supervision of bank holding companies (BHCs) on a consolidated basis. Prudential supervision involves monitoring and oversight to assess whether these firms are engaged in unsafe or unsound practi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5a58b33a5e49ca2f25db7852a8a581ab
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr729.pdf
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr729.pdf