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pro vyhledávání: '"David James Barnett"'
Autor:
David James Barnett
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 130:227-262
Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form . If there w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b7b56ecfddf9755e87b16a0f7e0a4f55
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8809906
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8809906
Autor:
David James Barnett
According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1f3df7ffacc19ae0e65a245d5bd45bd2
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0001
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0001
Autor:
David James Barnett
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 124:353-392
A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c6f49b4bf1db0155e327a770a7a3b59b
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895337
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895337
Autor:
David James Barnett
Publikováno v:
Noûs. 50:184-212
This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::55cb8f2205491466f7015ca0db845194
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12088
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12088
Autor:
David James Barnett
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 171:177-205
If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::08bec86ee07bb5b212c6d1f0efaf962c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0261-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0261-0
Autor:
David James Barnett
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 113:89-100
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9d0020d265e3b114ec7e35baa70b2444
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-1-89
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-1-89