Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 19
pro vyhledávání: '"David Devidi"'
Publikováno v:
Philosophy. 98:165-190
People with significant cognitive disabilities and others who advocate on their behalf routinely state their claims in terms of enabling people to claim their full citizenship. Informed by the results of a study by one of the authors, we draw attenti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::25bc08f4ca1130ff9da655f76bc962c5
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819122000420
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819122000420
Autor:
Catherine Klausen, David DeVidi
Publikováno v:
Dialogue. 56:357-379
In this paper, we consider the ‘mere-difference’ view of disability, a popular strategy amongst disability theorists and advocates. This view is nicely summarized by Elizabeth Barnes, who claims that disability is “a natural part of human diver
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::372d5feb4ca282d386f41dfba0350243
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217317000397
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217317000397
Autor:
David DeVidi
Publikováno v:
Philosophia Mathematica. 23:276-280
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f45e7dc2790e20a59726f190ff750ef8
https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv005
https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv005
Autor:
David DeVidi, Herbert Korte
Publikováno v:
Studies in Universal Logic ISBN: 9783319247540
A simplified and improved system of natural deduction for classical predicate logic is presented. The inference rules of existential instantiation EI, existential elimination (\(\exists\) E), and universal generalization UG (\(\forall\) I) are not em
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::444b4ddba97fe61045f831b6b9d6f75f
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24756-4_7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24756-4_7
Autor:
David DeVidi, Tim Kenyon
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 81:481-495
An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motiva
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8066b9555ff301c33b7642e21a5568b3
https://doi.org/10.1080/713659757
https://doi.org/10.1080/713659757
Autor:
David DeVidi, Graham Solomon
Publikováno v:
Journal of Philosophical Logic. 28:1-28
It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an objec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3035de8ba9ec9f9558c328bb71591975
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004294325183
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004294325183
Autor:
Graham Solomon, David DeVidi
Publikováno v:
Dialogue. 38:785-799
RésuméCet article discute diverses confusions, actueles ou potentielles, liées á la bivalence et au tiers exclu. Il s'agit, en particulier, 1) d'examiner divers cas illustrant les rapports entre la bivalence et le tiers exclu (cette section doit
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aedae5e0415cc623e67c3cd923e1dd60
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006715
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006715
Autor:
David DeVidi, Graham Solomon
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 75:201-213
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c3683b3084621bde07a0fa7278d5011f
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409712347801
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409712347801
Autor:
David DeVidi
Publikováno v:
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 10:563-565
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3632d43902f091d42780721d374bde8f
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1079898600003620
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1079898600003620
The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell's own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-relate