Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"David Builes"'
Autor:
David, Builes
Publikováno v:
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind: Volume 4.
Externí odkaz:
https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198924159.003.0002
Autor:
David Builes
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 180:1031-1048
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5604b7d40bc1bfb4e07ceb2471f1713c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01927-5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01927-5
Autor:
David Builes, Trevor Teitel
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Perspectives. 36:5-30
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dac79e74b6e39278dbe89ca3911de4a0
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12171
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12171
Autor:
David Builes, Caspar Hare
Publikováno v:
Analysis.
We start by presenting three different views that jointly imply that every person has many conscious beings in their immediate vicinity, and that the number greatly varies from person to person. We then present and assess an argument to the conclusio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c67772131d1f19e5a5596a6a23718a82
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad004
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad004
Autor:
David Builes, Jessica M. Wilson
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 179:2199-2236
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5b74077f394bd6558ae0f88e957ff8d1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01760-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01760-8
Autor:
David Builes
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 82:15-23
I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe simply by looking at the time. The argument is an extension of the 'epistemic objection' towards Growing Block theories.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d48911945800c9591d3b5e0123eeb58c
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab008
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab008
Autor:
David Builes
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 100:485-495
In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontolog...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7312d8639065c905aa8d13ec64a67819
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1931377
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1931377
Autor:
David Builes
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Quarterly. 72:65-76
Platonists affirm the existence of abstract mathematical objects, and Nominalists deny the existence of abstract mathematical objects. While there are standard arguments in favor of Nominalism, these arguments fail to account for the necessity of Nom
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e40f7c2d7b60d3439e046872defbbdb8
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab017
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab017
Autor:
David Builes
Publikováno v:
The Monist. 104:1-27
What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals (or ‘particulars’, or ‘substrata’) that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, obje
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::568100b66e7e5f1c17e301c2a8bf4147
https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa023
https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa023
Autor:
David Builes
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 104:129-149
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::eedd61bdf971eed27d5030fad10874fd
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12753
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12753