Zobrazeno 1 - 10 of 46 pro vyhledávání: '"David Baelde"'
1
Akademický článek
A Reduced Semantics for Deciding Trace Equivalence
Autor: David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, Lucca Hirschi
Publikováno v: Logical Methods in Computer Science, Vol Volume 13, Issue 2 (2017)
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence properties in suitable process algebras. It has been shown that such properties can be decided for interesting classes of finite processes (i.e., without repli
Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/b4282260beab4542839361085ec07261
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
2
Akademický článek
Abella: A System for Reasoning about Relational Specifications
Autor: David Baelde, Kaustuv Chaudhuri, Andrew Gacek, Dale Miller, Gopalan Nadathur, Alwen Tiu, Yuting Wang
Publikováno v: Journal of Formalized Reasoning, Vol 7, Iss 2, Pp 1-89 (2014)
The Abella interactive theorem prover is based on an intuitionistic logic that allows for inductive and co-inductive reasoning over relations. Abella supports the λ-tree approach to treating syntax containing binders: it allows simply typed λ-terms
Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/da2e3ae3b5924fbb932304f2af1e53c4
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
4
An Interactive Prover for Protocol Verification in the Computational Model
Autor: David Baelde, Adrien Koutsos, Charlie Jacomme, Stéphanie Delaune, Solene Moreau
Publikováno v: SP 2021-42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP 2021-42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2021, San Fransisco / Virtual, United States
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
International audience; Given the central importance of designing secure protocols, providing solid mathematical foundations and computer-assisted methods to attest for their correctness is becoming crucial. Here, we elaborate on the formal approach
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f268489e2177e863fdd6c1294ad9c19b
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03172119/document
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
5
A Method for Proving Unlinkability of Stateful Protocols
Autor: David Baelde, Solene Moreau, Stéphanie Delaune
Publikováno v: CSF
33rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
33rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Jun 2020, Boston, United States
International audience; The rise of contactless and wireless devices such as mobile phones and RFID chips justifies significant concerns over privacy, and calls for communication protocols that ensure some form of unlinkability. Formally specifying t
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2c632679e43007df0f8a8f6f8f7f455d
https://doi.org/10.1109/csf49147.2020.00020
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
6
Decidable XPath Fragments in the Real World
Autor: Anthony Lick, Sylvain Schmitz, David Baelde
Publikováno v: 38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS'19)
38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS'19), 2019, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ⟨10.1145/3294052.3319685⟩
38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS'19), Jun 2019, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ⟨10.1145/3294052.3319685⟩
PODS
International audience; XPath is arguably the most popular query language for selecting elements in XML documents. Besides query evaluation, query satisfiability and containment are the main computational problems for XPath; they are useful, for inst
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::de6dd9086c5818fedf31b36033b2afc8
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01852475
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
7
POR for Security Protocol Equivalences: Beyond Action-Determinism
Autor: Lucca Hirschi, Stéphanie Delaune, David Baelde
Publikováno v: ESORICS
ESORICS, pp.385-405, 2018, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-99073-6_19⟩
Computer Security ISBN: 9783319990729
ESORICS (1)
Computer Security-23rd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Computer Security-23rd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2018, Barcelone, Spain
Formal methods have proved effective to automatically analyze protocols. Over the past years, much research has focused on verifying trace equivalence on protocols, which is notably used to model many interesting privacy properties, e.g., anonymity o
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8cb27444e0fe042e40354a5394d61fc6
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02390219
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
8
A special issue on structural proof theory, automated reasoning and computation in celebration of Dale Miller’s 60th birthday
Autor: Alexis Saurin, Amy P. Felty, Gopalan Nadathur, David Baelde
Publikováno v: Mathematical Structures in Computer Science. 29:1007-1008
The genesis of this special issue was in a meeting that took place at Université Paris Diderot on December 15 and 16, 2016. Dale Miller, Professor at École polytechnique, had turned 60 a few days earlier. In a career spanning over three decades and
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::059cd23d6f015cf8b479a84aa4acd496
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0960129519000136
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
9
A method for unbounded verification of privacy-type properties
Autor: David Baelde, Lucca Hirschi, Stéphanie Delaune
Publikováno v: Journal of Computer Security
Journal of Computer Security, 2019, 27 (3), pp.277-342. ⟨10.3233/JCS-171070⟩
Journal of Computer Security, IOS Press, 2019, 27 (3), pp.277-342. ⟨10.3233/JCS-171070⟩
In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools and techniq
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5d524a23397ec1fe3e92f6d601fefe99
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.02049
Zobrazit plný text záznamu
10
Symbolic Verification of Privacy-Type Properties for Security Protocols with XOR
Autor: Steve Kremer, Ivan Gazeau, David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune
Publikováno v: 2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
CSF 2017-30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
CSF 2017-30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Aug 2017, Santa Barbara, United States. pp.15
CSF
International audience; In symbolic verification of security protocols, process equivalences have recently been used extensively to model strong secrecy, anonymity and unlinkability properties. However, tool support for automated analysis of equivale
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cd1284e0219cdb15922b8fef90101906
Zobrazit plný text záznamu

Vyhledávací nástroje:

Upřesnit hledání

Omezení vyhledávání
Plný text Recenzováno Digitální knihovna AV ČR
Zdroje