Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"Dario Paccagnan"'
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 67:1698-1712
The price of anarchy and price of stability are two well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics centers on the equilibria that
Autor:
Jason R. Marden, Dario Paccagnan
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 67:618-632
A fundamental component of the game theoretic approach to distributed control is the design of local utility functions. Relative to resource allocation problems that are additive over the resources, Part I showed how to design local utilities so as t
Publikováno v:
Annual Reviews in Control. 53:315-328
Publikováno v:
INFORMS Journal on Computing.
Over the past decade, GPS-enabled traffic applications such as Google Maps and Waze have become ubiquitous and have had a significant influence on billions of daily commuters’ travel patterns. A consequence of the online route suggestions of such a
Autor:
Yize Wang, Dario Paccagnan
Publikováno v:
2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC).
Publikováno v:
2022 American Control Conference (ACC).
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 66 (12)
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, a Nash equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In this arti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5b63fddef5e7d092e9755c5b81004be4
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/520110
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/520110
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Control, 62, 22-32. Lavoisier
Pure TUe
Proceedings of the 19th European Control Conference (ECC 2021)
Pure TUe
Proceedings of the 19th European Control Conference (ECC 2021)
When people choose routes minimizing their individual delay, the aggregate congestion can be much higher compared to that experienced by a centrally-imposed routing. Yet centralized routing is incompatible with the presence of self-interested users.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9a73e1e5ec128245b4f841712eb632c4
https://research.tue.nl/nl/publications/b9ae230a-27ed-4419-9781-fdaedab3e2bf
https://research.tue.nl/nl/publications/b9ae230a-27ed-4419-9781-fdaedab3e2bf
Autor:
Martin Gairing, Dario Paccagnan
Publikováno v:
EC
In this work, we consider the problem of minimising the social cost in atomic congestion games. For this problem, we provide tight computational lower bounds along with taxation mechanisms yielding polynomial time algorithms with optimal approximatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::24b5519e692f07497e6a5dbd576ae429
http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3124802/1/2105.07480v1.pdf
http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3124802/1/2105.07480v1.pdf
This article studies a stochastic robotic surveillance problem where a mobile robot moves randomly on a graph to capture a potential intruder that strategically attacks a location on the graph. The intruder is assumed to be omniscient: It knows the c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0395c9ada4a27abe5f1071c1f2cb48c4
http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07604
http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07604