Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Daniele Sgaravatti"'
Autor:
Daniele Sgaravatti, Giuseppe Spolaore
Publikováno v:
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 7:132-138
Graham Priest proposed an argument for the conclusion that ‘nothing’ occurs as a singular term and not as a quantifier in a sentence like (1) ‘The cosmos came into existence out of nothing’. Priest’s point is that, intuitively, (1) entails
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::05a43c82c74d9153b6b1c9ec3d67c0e2
https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.274
https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.274
Autor:
Daniele Sgaravatti
Williamson and others have recently argued against the significance of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. My aim in this paper is to explain, defend, and expand upon one of these arguments. In the first section, I develop in some detail a line of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::602c134d2a1f4d1e39a6b5295a0c8e71
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/871754
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/871754
Autor:
Daniele Sgaravatti
Publikováno v:
Dialectica. 70:217-228
Lowe claims that having knowledge of the essence of an object is a precondition for thinking about it. Lowe supports this claim with roughly the following argument: you cannot think about something unless you know what you are thinking about; and to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c1d4296973a3758439f2c49f55868e72
https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12141
https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12141
Autor:
Daniele Sgaravatti
In this paper, I defend the view that any good account of the logical form of thought experiments should contain a conditional. Moreover, there are some reasons to think it should be a counterfactual conditional. First, I defend Williamson’s accoun
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f9d029381e4ed54cc809d6f91b42e213
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/871776
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/871776
Autor:
Daniele Sgaravatti
Esperimenti mentali e metodo filosofico. Un saggio anti-eccezionalista
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______4094::56224a91f51a87eb6093838c9b8f0604
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/871764
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/871764
Autor:
Daniele Sgaravatti
The paper aims to offer an account of the cognitive capacities involved in judgements about thought experiments, without appealing to the notions of analyticity or intuition. I suggest that we employ a competence in the application of the relevant co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::344dfe57c36e678093342b5e8e7fa46d
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/875245
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/875245