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pro vyhledávání: '"Daniel N. Hauser"'
Autor:
J. Aislinn Bohren, Daniel N. Hauser
Publikováno v:
AEA Papers and Proceedings. 113:665-670
Model misspecification is a common approach to model belief formation distortions. Misspecified models can be decomposed into two classes of distortions: prospective and retrospective biases (Bohren and Hauser 2023). Prospective biases correspond to
Autor:
Daniel N. Hauser
I study how a firm manages its reputation by both investing in the quality of its product and censoring, hiding bad news from consumers. Without censorship, the threat of bad news provides strong incentives for investment. I highlight discontinuities
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4dc311f0ce9d18ce07e1d4388d638137
https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/120601
https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/120601
Autor:
Daniel N. Hauser, J. Aislinn Bohren
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 89:3025-3077
This paper develops a general framework to study how misinterpreting information impacts learning. Our main result is a simple criterion to characterize long‐run beliefs based on the underlying form of misspecification. We present this characteriza
Autor:
Daniel N. Hauser, J. Aislinn Bohren
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper develops a general framework to study how misinterpreting information impacts learning. Our main result is a simple criterion to characterize long-run beliefs based on the underlying form of misspecification. We present this characterizati
Autor:
J. Aislinn Bohren, Daniel N. Hauser
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper develops a general framework to study how misinterpreting information impacts learning. We consider sequential social learning and passive individual learning settings in which individuals observe signals and the actions of predecessors. I
Autor:
Daniel N. Hauser
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
A firm builds its reputation not only by investing in the quality of its products, but also by controlling the information consumers can see. I consider a model in which a firm invests in both product quality and in a costly signaling technology in o