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pro vyhledávání: '"Daniel Herbold"'
Autor:
Daniel Herbold, Heiner Schumacher
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 121:435-452
This paper studies how workers' on-the-job search influences optimal incentives in organizations. We analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent multitasks between working for the principal and searching for other job opportunities. The agent
Autor:
Daniel Herbold, Heiner Schumacher
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 41:490-502
Autor:
Daniel Herbold
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives require that the agent re
Autor:
Daniel Herbold
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.