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pro vyhledávání: '"Daniel F. Hartner"'
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
SATS. 21:179-198
One of the dominant traditions in normative ethics is characterised by the attempt to develop a comprehensive moral theory that can distinguish right from wrong in a range of cases by drawing on a philosophical account of the good. Familiar versions
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner, Kari L. Theurer
Publikováno v:
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 38:189-204
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
Teaching Philosophy. 41:151-173
What is the proper content of a course in professional ethics, such as business ethics, engineering ethics, or medical ethics? Though courses in professional ethics have been present in colleges and universities for decades, the question remains larg
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
Studia Philosophica Estonica. :22-54
'Folk psychology' is a term that refers to the way that ordinary people think and talk about minds. But over roughly the last four decades the term has come to be used in rather different ways by philosophers and psychologists engaged in technical pr
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
Teaching Ethics. 15:349-368
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
Biology & Philosophy. 28:523-539
Much work in contemporary philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy hinges on the concept of ‘representation,’ but that concept inherits a problematic ambiguity from neuroscience, where scientists may distinguish between cognitive and physiological
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 165:921-937
Three proponents of the Canberra Plan, namely Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, have developed a collective functionalist program—Canberra Functionalism—spanning from philosophical psychology to ethics. They argue that conceptual analysis is an indispe
Autor:
Daniel F. Hartner
Publikováno v:
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. 7:1
[I]t is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking (Anscombe 1958, 1).A great deal of the recent work in cog