Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Dan Sasaki"'
Autor:
James H. Cardon, Dan Sasaki
Publikováno v:
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Vol 2, Iss 3 (2004)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/f25c6cefced44f8e885d31b4a6a1ea2f
Autor:
Dan Sasaki
Publikováno v:
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics. 23:327-341
In an infinite-horizon oligopoly game, if moves are not synchronised across firms, sustainability of tacitly collusive equilibria becomes substantially distinct from that in a classical simultaneous-move supergame. In linear duopoly, the critical dis
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d8cfe3255ee9d6fb0da75a1d6a797eeb
https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2016.1188753
https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2016.1188753
Publikováno v:
SMPTE Motion Imaging Journal. 122:49-54
This paper details technical features of the first series of high-speed prime lenses designed for a new 70mm digital format developed by Panavision. These new lenses offer full aperture (f/2.5) performance at or near the diffraction limit from near-u
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::71cfab499bf96ae4c65c356e2a99e982
https://doi.org/10.5594/j18269
https://doi.org/10.5594/j18269
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 20:829-854
We investigate the interplay between firms’ decisions in product development, either joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated pricing, either collusive or Bertrand–Nash. A joint venture develops a single product, whereas independent ventu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d239f58a372e98830ee1b1787a4d02b2
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00082-5
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00082-5
Autor:
Dan Sasaki, Luca Lambertini
Publikováno v:
The Japanese Economic Review. 53:77-93
In an oligopoly supergame, firms face an obvious technological constraint: the positivity of their production quantities. Applicability of single-period optimal punishment hinges critically upon the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, as wel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::51ef4b624cb169ba876beff470865cbb
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00214
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00214
Autor:
Dan Sasaki, Midori Hirokawa
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics Management Strategy. 10:435-461
We model and analyze a priori symmetric duopoly where supply quantity adjustment is slow and time-consuming. The state of demand is ex ante uncertain, and becomes observable a certain time period after at least one firm's entry. We characterize those
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cfb99904231c8ca8e680fba42caae870
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00435.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00435.x
Autor:
Dan Sasaki, Mei Wen
Publikováno v:
Economic Record. 77:283-290
We analyse oligopolistic interactions between a welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm in a repeated game. We find that the public firm can hold excess capacity as a strategic punishment device to sustain a subgame perfec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5d88ee6770eb7f14ca7f5094990e5291
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.t01-1-00023
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.t01-1-00023
Autor:
Dan Sasaki, Luca Lambertini
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 72:117-120
In an oligopoly supergame, firms’ actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity constraints. These constraints can obstruct the practicability of some of the tacitly collusive subgame perfect equilibria, such as single-period optim
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f43c5f9938c4e7e722bac0b0575742e2
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00409-8
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00409-8
Autor:
Dan Sasaki
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 73:1-23
This paper discusses the value of information in supermodular and submodular games, using a simple duopoly model where the level of demand is uncertain. It is shown that the value of information issuperadditive (resp.,subadditive) between players if
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::18a6b0878161e60b70a2c06195cbd3d3
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02339579
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02339579
Autor:
Midori Hirokawa, Dan Sasaki
Publikováno v:
Bulletin of Economic Research. 53:19-34
This paper re-examines endogenous Stackelberg leader–follower relations by modelling an explicitly dynamic market. We analyze a twice-repeated duopoly where, in the beginning, each firm chooses either a quantity-sticky production mode or a quantity
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f5de1bc3c833f591544014a5b20f9eaa
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00115
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00115