Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 29
pro vyhledávání: '"Dag Morten Dalen"'
Publikováno v:
Nordic Journal of Health Economics (2021)
Our objective is to study the competition effect of biosimilar entry in centralized tenders for an expensive category or drugs - TNF-inhibitors. We use monthly observations of prices and volumes for all brands and biosimilars in this drug category in
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9fd9859c74644a7fb905dea527245111
Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pric
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4a8f171751abc8c2160ed0991d617259
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
Publikováno v:
Nordic Journal of Health Economics (2021)
Our objective is to study the competition effect of biosimilar entry in centralized tenders for an expensive category or drugs - TNF-inhibitors. We use monthly observations of prices and volumes for all brands and biosimilars in this drug category in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::13221e5dde51d83269f4258eae0c86df
https://doi.org/10.5617/njhe.7394
https://doi.org/10.5617/njhe.7394
The purpose of this paper is to estimate to what extent patients/doctors respond to prices when making a choice between a brand name product and its generics, and also how pharmacies respond to government regulation and to prices set by brand name pr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::25146c18726df5891cd7bcf77671c312
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/70861
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/70861
Autor:
Espen R. Moen, Dag Morten Dalen
Publikováno v:
Australian Economic Papers. 51:134-146
We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership in an incomplete contract framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (HSV). We add two new elements to their model. First, the government may offer cost-sharing contracts when proc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e0d7b4a21a616534ab8f1a6c992e5255
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.2012.00428.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.2012.00428.x
Publikováno v:
The European Journal of Health Economics. 12:49-59
The importance of prices, doctor and patient characteristics, and market institutions for the likelihood of choosing generic drugs instead of the more expensive original brand-name version are examined. Using an extensive dataset extracted from The N
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::05cb8a5029d683782437628c5c9874ec
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-010-0226-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-010-0226-6
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 24:269-285
This paper explores how the government's choice of renewal policy in public procurement programs can be used as a mechanism to provide firms with incentives to supply quality. A public service is produced by several firms. The firms participate in a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5bd7b5712d6a0d9d471e7fa234ef9b64
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.04.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.04.004
Autor:
Andres Gomez-Lobo, Dag Morten Dalen
Publikováno v:
Transportation. 30:371-386
In this paper a cost frontier model is estimated for an eleven-year panel of Norwegian bus companies (1136 company-year observations) using the methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). The main objective of the paper is to investigate to wh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1be6b1833c3a73311e3f1a21f2442924
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024784517628
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024784517628
Autor:
Dag Morten Dalen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Regulatory Economics. 18:133-150
This paper analyses a regulated firm's incentives to undertake catching-up investments when the firm has private information about the initial technology and the regulator is unable to commit himself to incentive contracts prior to the firm's investm
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::495b7be1210bd2c0079da3a82886738c
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008168501827
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008168501827